A Computable Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capacity Investment

44 Pages Posted: 14 May 2024 Last revised: 5 Mar 2025

See all articles by Gautam Gowrisankaran

Gautam Gowrisankaran

Columbia University; HEC Montreal; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics

Date Written: May 2024

Abstract

We analyze a class of dynamic models that has several recent applications, where each period, each firm receives a private shock to the marginal cost of investment and chooses among many ordered capacity levels. Simulation methods to compute these models can result in non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium, while including multinomial shocks leads to counterintuitive predictions. We provide a computationally fast method to calculate optimal investment probabilities given value functions that iteratively finds investment levels chosen with positive probability and cutoffs of private information shocks across choices. Our method is useful to practitioners seeking to estimate models with continuous firm choices.

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Suggested Citation

Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp, A Computable Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capacity Investment (May 2024). NBER Working Paper No. w32399, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4825984

Gautam Gowrisankaran (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HEC Montreal ( email )

3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H2X 2L3
Canada

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics ( email )

Vienna, A-1210
Austria

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