Labor Market Consequences of Pay Transparency: Evidence from the Initial Pay Ratio Disclosure

52 Pages Posted: 15 May 2024

See all articles by Michael Dambra

Michael Dambra

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management

Joshua Khavis

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management

Zhiru Lin

State University of New York (SUNY) - Buffalo

Inho Suk

State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo - School of Management; Korea University Business School (KUBS)

Date Written: May 13, 2024

Abstract

This paper examines the labor market consequences of employee-pay transparency for rank-and-file employees. We exploit the introduction of the Pay Ratio Disclosure (PRD), where median employee pay becomes publicly disclosed for the first time, which allows for comparisons of employee mobility for firms with and without the PRD using a difference-in-differences analysis. We find that employees are more likely to depart firms disclosing median employee pay and provide evidence that employee pay comparisons (both within and across firms) serve as a mechanism. We also find evidence consistent with disclosures of median employee pay increasing labor market mobility in the aggregate across geographic locations and industries. Collectively, we provide novel evidence that increased pay transparency facilitates pay comparison within and across firms, which results in greater labor market mobility for employees.

Keywords: median employee pay, CEO-to-median employee pay ratio, pay transparency, pay comparison, employee turnover, labor market

JEL Classification: G18, G30, J31, J53, J63

Suggested Citation

Dambra, Michael and Khavis, Joshua and Lin, Zhiru and Suk, Inho, Labor Market Consequences of Pay Transparency: Evidence from the Initial Pay Ratio Disclosure (May 13, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4826506 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4826506

Michael Dambra

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management ( email )

255 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States

Joshua Khavis

University at Buffalo (SUNY) - School of Management ( email )

346 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY NY 14260
United States
7166453274 (Phone)

Zhiru Lin (Contact Author)

State University of New York (SUNY) - Buffalo ( email )

3435 Main Street
Buffalo, NY 14214
United States

Inho Suk

State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

342 Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14260-4000
United States
716-645-3215 (Phone)

Korea University Business School (KUBS) ( email )

Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Gu
Seoul 136-701, 136701
Korea

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