Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

45 Pages Posted: 15 May 2024

See all articles by Anton Suvorov

Anton Suvorov

New Economic School (NES); National Research University Higher School of Economics

Jeroen van de Ven

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE - CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 14, 2024

Abstract

Although they usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information within teams. We show that good news about one’s performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion.

Keywords: Group Delusion, Information Disclosure, Beliefs, Skepticism, Social Image, Experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D83, D84, D91

Suggested Citation

Suvorov, Anton and van de Ven, Jeroen and Villeval, Marie Claire, Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion (May 14, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4827884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4827884

Anton Suvorov

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

Nobel Str., 3
Moscow, Skolkovo 121205
Russia
+74959569508 (Phone)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Shabolovka 26
Moscow, 119049
Russia

Jeroen Van de Ven (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE - CNRS ( email )

35 rue Raulin
LYON, 69007
France
+33 688314656 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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