“Delicate and Embarrassing”: U.S. Loans to Suppress Haitian Independence

23 Pages Posted: 17 May 2024 Last revised: 20 May 2024

See all articles by Mitu Gulati

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Ugo Panizza

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics; CEPR

Kim Oosterlinck

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

Mark C. Weidemaier

University of North Carolina School of Law

Date Written: May 16, 2024

Abstract

This paper describes the response of George Washington's administration to a plea for emergency war financing from French colonists who were trying to quash a slave rebellion in Haiti (then Saint Domingue). Washington bypassed Congress and authorized assistance to the French planters, hoping that France would recognize and repay the resulting debt to the United States. The exploration of this episode offers insights on how legal constraints can be overlooked in times of crisis due to political imperatives. On the international law front, it reveals that legal norms perceived as firmly established today were more malleable in the late 18th century. To place the story of U.S. loans and foreign interference in Haiti in historical context, we provide a brief overview of Haiti's independence debt to France and the U.S. loans that led to the American occupation of 1915-1934. Our exploration, primarily sourced from secondary materials, raises more questions than answers. Nonetheless, we hope that by outlining the bare bones of the story and posing pertinent questions, we can inspire further research that digs deeper into this fascinating historical record.

Keywords: Haiti, George Washington, Loans, Odious Debt; Sovereign Debt, Emergency War Financing, U.S. Foreign Policy

JEL Classification: N41, F34, K33, H56

Suggested Citation

Gulati, Mitu and Panizza, Ugo and Oosterlinck, Kim and Weidemaier, Mark C., “Delicate and Embarrassing”: U.S. Loans to Suppress Haitian Independence (May 16, 2024). Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2024-42, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2024-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4830167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4830167

Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Ugo Panizza

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Department of Economics ( email )

Geneva Avenue de la Paix 11A
Geneva, 1202
Switzerland

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

Kim Oosterlinck

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ( email )

Mark C. Weidemaier

University of North Carolina School of Law ( email )

Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
919.843.4373 (Phone)

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