Cross-border carbon taxes and shareholder wealth

67 Pages Posted: 18 May 2024

See all articles by Marta Alonso

Marta Alonso

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Martin Jacob

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Gaizka Ormazabal

University of Navarra, IESE Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Robert A. Raney

IESE Business School; University of Washington

Date Written: May 17, 2024

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of cross-border carbon taxes on shareholder wealth. For identification, we analyze stock price reactions to news about the introduction of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in the EU. We find that stock prices of EU importers of CBAM products respond more negatively to the announcement of the CBAM than those of similar non-European firms. The results from cross-sectional tests support the interpretation that the documented patterns reflect EU firms’ limited ability to pass on the tax cost in commercial relations with non-EU counterparts. Collectively, our results shed doubt on the ability of cross-border carbon taxes to level the playing field between local and foreign firms.

Keywords: Carbon pricing, market reactions, border adjustment, climate regulation

JEL Classification: H2, Q5, F1

Suggested Citation

Alonso, Marta and Jacob, Martin and Ormazabal, Gaizka and Raney, Robert A., Cross-border carbon taxes and shareholder wealth (May 17, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4832122 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4832122

Marta Alonso

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marta-alonso/

Martin Jacob (Contact Author)

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Gaizka Ormazabal

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Robert A. Raney

IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
+34 679470669 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.iese.edu

University of Washington ( email )

Seattle, WA 98195
United States
2067550125 (Phone)
2067550125 (Fax)

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