Interim Valuations, Predictability, and Outcomes in Private Equity

34 Pages Posted: 20 May 2024

See all articles by Ege Y. Ercan

Ege Y. Ercan

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Steven N. Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

Ilya A. Strebulaev

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Written: May 13, 2024

Abstract

Using a novel dataset of U.S. buyout and VC investments, we study the informativeness of managers' interim valuation reports of portfolio companies on final outcomes. We find that when investors assess the performance of individual portfolio companies, they can do better than just relying on the most recent reported valuation. The history of reported valuations is informative as well. Particularly for buyout funds, portfolio company investments with greater past staleness or more frequent markdowns tend to perform more poorly in the future than other investments. Moreover, investments with larger reported interim marks tend to have have lower future returns. That is, past reported returns negatively predict future realized returns. Based on this predictability, the combined knowledge over interim multiple, past staleness, and past markdown frequency can help predict whether an investment will end up in the left or right tail of all investments. These predictions are informative as early as the first year of the investment.

Keywords: Private Equity, Venture Capital, Buyout Funds, Interim Valuations, Stale Prices, Return Predictability

JEL Classification: G17, G23, G24, G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Ercan, Ege Y. and Kaplan, Steven Neil and Strebulaev, Ilya A., Interim Valuations, Predictability, and Outcomes in Private Equity (May 13, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4833819 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4833819

Ege Y. Ercan (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Steven Neil Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Ilya A. Strebulaev

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/ilya-strebulaev

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

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