Understanding the Constitutionality of the Actions of the UK When Formulating the Policy Agenda of International Organisations Such as the OECD and the Imposition of International Standards on British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.

26 Pages Posted: 20 May 2024

Date Written: May 20, 2024

Abstract

In this paper the author reviews the constitutional arrangements which exist between the United Kingdom, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Territories (CDOTs) in the context of international tax reform. The author highlights a number of extra-constitutional actions by the United Kingdom and responses by the CDOTs and contrast those actions with the devolved powers granted under the relevant constitutional arrangements. The author will conclude that the UK’s behaviour in the area of international tax reform amounts to ‘intervention by the back door’ including threats of effective sanctions in the form of defensive measures and political threats from senior politicians all whilst the UK holds the power to intervene to legislate directly.
The author will appeal for a modern constitutional convention to establish a properly delineated relationship where the rights and obligations of the parties are properly laid out to give measurable outcomes and a maximisation of self-government within the CDOTs whilst protecting the position of the United Kingdom as the sovereign state with responsibility for the enactment of international commitments by the CDOTs.

Keywords: Gibraltar, Jersey, OECD, United Kingdom, constitution, overseas territories, crown dependencies, colony, constitutional, tax, international tax, BEPS, offshore

JEL Classification: K33, K34, F54, F55, F53

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Grahame, Understanding the Constitutionality of the Actions of the UK When Formulating the Policy Agenda of International Organisations Such as the OECD and the Imposition of International Standards on British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. (May 20, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4834164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4834164

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