Freedom of Thought: Absolute Protection of Mental Privacy and Mental Integrity? Considering the Case of Neurotechnology in Criminal Justice

Ligthart, Sjors; Van de Pol, Naomi

Freedom of Thought: Absolute Protection of Mental Privacy and Mental Integrity? Considering the Case of Neurotechnology in Criminal Justice

In Patrick O’Callaghan & Bethany Shiner (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Right to Freedom of Thought, Cambridge University Press 2024, forthcoming

15 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2024

See all articles by Sjors Ligthart

Naomi Van de Pol

Independent

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 25, 2024

Abstract

In recent discussions over the RFoT, it has been emphasised that for an adequate understanding, development, and application of the right, one should consider how the RFoT relates to or complements other rights, such as the right to mental privacy and mental integrity. In this chapter, we consider the interrelationship between the RFoT and the protection of mental privacy and mental integrity. We explore how the absolute protection offered by the RFoT relates to the qualified protection of mental privacy and mental integrity offered by the right to respect for private life.

Keywords: Freedom of Thought, Threshold, Mental Privacy, Mental Integrity

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ligthart, Sjors and Van de Pol, Naomi, Freedom of Thought: Absolute Protection of Mental Privacy and Mental Integrity? Considering the Case of Neurotechnology in Criminal Justice (May 25, 2024). In Patrick O’Callaghan & Bethany Shiner (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Right to Freedom of Thought, Cambridge University Press 2024, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4841153