The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

39 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2004

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments.

Keywords: Political Stability, Coalition Governments, Constitutional Design

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio M., The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies (December 2003). PIER Working Paper No. 03-037. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=484363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.484363

Daniel Diermeier (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University ( email )

Department of Economics MS-22
Rice University P.O Box 1892
Houston, TX Texas 77251-1892
United States
7133483453 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://he6.web.rice.edu/

Antonio M. Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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