Is Younger Better? The Impacts of Early Promotion on Chinese Politicians and Regional Economic Development

Abstract

This paper tries to understand how the age of being promoted to be a head official of a county government predicts later success in one's political career, and what this success means for local economic development. Using a unique setting with an implicit age limit for moving up the ladder, we employ the turnover data of top county leaders in China between 1990 and 2017, and find that the likelihood of further promotion to a city-level or provincial government is significantly higher for politicians who get to the previous rank earlier, with 41 years and one month old being the age cutoff of discontinuity. The county officials, especially mayors rather than party secretaries, who secure their positions just before this age cutoff have a lower likelihood of creating excess gross regional product, compared to those who are just late by months. There is suggestive evidence that this phenomenon is explained by education, political connections, and incentive distortions. We also find that, excess GDP growth does not necessarily require more carbon emissions, financial institutions, or patent applications.

Keywords: Political turnover, Age restriction, Economic performance, Economic development JEL Classification: H11

JEL Classification: H11, H70, J24, J63, P30