The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Privacy Regulation for Consumer Marketing

40 Pages Posted: 30 May 2024 Last revised: 30 Jan 2025

See all articles by Jean-Pierre Dubé

Jean-Pierre Dubé

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Marketing Science Institute (MSI)

John G. Lynch

University of Colorado-Boulder, Leeds School of Business - Center for Research on Consumer Financial Decision Making

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Mert Demirer

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Avi Goldfarb

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Garrett Johnson

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Anja Lambrecht

London Business School

Tesary Lin

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Anna Tuchman

Northwestern - Kellogg

Catherine E. Tucker

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS)

Date Written: January 29, 2025

Abstract

As businesses increasingly rely on granular consumer data, the public has increasingly pushed for enhanced regulation to protect consumers’ privacy. We provide a perspective based on the academic marketing literature that evaluates the various benefits and costs of existing and pending government regulations and corporate privacy policies. We make four key points. First, data-based personalized marketing is not automatically harmful. Second, consumers have heterogeneous privacy preferences, and privacy policies may unintentionally favor the preferences of the rich. Third, privacy regulations may stifle innovation by entrepreneurs who are more likely to cater to underserved, niche consumer segments. Fourth, privacy measures may favor large companies who have less need for third-party data and can afford compliance costs. We also discuss technology platforms’ recent proposals for privacy solutions that mitigate some of these harms, but, again, in a way that might disadvantage small firms and entrepreneurs.

Keywords: Privacy, consumer protection, discrimination, digital exclusion, competition, regulation

JEL Classification: K2, M3

Suggested Citation

Dube, Jean-Pierre H. and Lynch, John G. and Bergemann, Dirk and Demirer, Mert and Goldfarb, Avi and Johnson, Garrett and Lambrecht, Anja and Lin, Tesary and Tuchman, Anna and Tucker, Catherine E., The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Privacy Regulation for Consumer Marketing (January 29, 2025). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 7129-24, Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 4847653, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4847653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4847653

Jean-Pierre H. Dube (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://gsb.uchicago.edu/fac/jean-pierre.dube

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Marketing Science Institute (MSI) ( email )

1000 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138-5396
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John G. Lynch

University of Colorado-Boulder, Leeds School of Business - Center for Research on Consumer Financial Decision Making ( email )

Leeds School of Business
Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States
919-971-5201 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.colorado.edu/business/john-g-lynch-jr

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Mert Demirer

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Avi Goldfarb

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
416-946-8604 (Phone)
416-978-5433 (Fax)

Garrett Johnson

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
6173534677 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/yn7skd

Anja Lambrecht

London Business School ( email )

Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Tesary Lin

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

Anna Tuchman

Northwestern - Kellogg ( email )

Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Rd.
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Catherine E. Tucker

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Management Science (MS) ( email )

100 Main St
E62-536
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cetucker.scripts.mit.edu

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