Subsidizing Business Entry in Competitive Credit Markets

Abstract

Business creation subsidies are a means for reducing firm debt and bankruptcy risk. Do they work? To answer the question, we consider a general equilibrium model where firms are financially constrained at entry and borrow in a competitive market by issuing long-term debt. A subsidy stimulates entry and market competition, which increases the bankruptcy rate of incumbent firms. If the subsidy is paid out ex ante to finance start-up expenditures, the subsidy reduces the debt and the bankruptcy rate of start-ups; if paid out ex post as a refund for start-up expenditures, the subsidy crowds out the equity rather than the debt of start-ups and their bankruptcy rate also increases. The model is calibrated to match North-South differences across Italian provinces. The optimal subsidy in the South is paid out entirely ex ante and yields an increase in welfare equivalent to almost one percent of consumption. When the same subsidy is paid out ex post as a proportion of 60 per cent, it results in a welfare loss of a similar amount. We discuss the implications for the ‘I Stay in the South’ policy recently introduced in Italy.

Keywords: Firm dynamics, overborrowing, ratchet effect

JEL Classification: E44, E62, G32, G33