Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price

41 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2004  

Adam C. Pritchard

University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

The Delaware Supreme Court has recently cleared a path for controlling shareholders to freeze out minority shareholders through a combination of a tender offer and a short-form merger. This article defends that doctrinal development against recent attacks from a number of commentators. I conclude that the risks of coercion are slight in this context and that minority shareholders are unlikely to benefit from more intrusive judicial scrutiny.

Suggested Citation

Pritchard, Adam C., Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price. Berkeley Business Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=485022

Adam C. Pritchard (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4048 (Phone)
734-647-7349 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
486
Rank
45,758
Abstract Views
2,222