The Great Regulatory Dodge

37 Harvard J. Law & Tech, 1231 (2023)

U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 24-030

34 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2024

See all articles by Katherine J. Strandburg

Katherine J. Strandburg

New York University School of Law

Salome Viljoen

University of Michigan Law School; Harvard University

Helen Nissenbaum

Cornell Tech NYC; Cornell Tech

Date Written: May 16, 2024

Abstract

U.S. privacy law is in a renewed moment of regulatory possibility, with both Congress and the states considering sweeping consumer privacy laws. These new proposals to enact "omnibus" privacy protections could be couched as an antidote to the current U.S. privacy regime: a patchwork of sectoral privacy laws stitched atop the background of FTC consumer contract enforcement. However, this Essay maintains that a one-size-fits-all approach cannot successfully capture both privacy's value and its variability. Yet, it is clearly the case that the present-day sectoral regime in the United States suffers from significant shortcomings. These shortcomings allow behaviors that seem clearly to violate privacy to flourish, effectively gouging meaningful oversight from sectoral privacy laws. We call these "regulatory dodges." Understanding and addressing these dodges is essential to preserving the value of contextual privacy protection. We first focus on specific health (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 1 ("HIPAA")) and financial (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 2 ("GLBA")) privacy regulations to elucidate two illustrative types of regulatory dodges. We then use the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") and the California Consumer Privacy Act 3 ("CCPA") (as amended by the Consumer Privacy Rights Act) to illustrate why omnibus regulation may not solve these problems. We conclude with proposals for designing more contextually sensitive, gap-free privacy law.

Keywords: privacy, contextual integrity, privacy regulation, sectoral privacy regulation

Suggested Citation

Strandburg, Katherine J. and Viljoen, Salome and Nissenbaum, Helen F., The Great Regulatory Dodge (May 16, 2024). 37 Harvard J. Law & Tech, 1231 (2023), U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 24-030, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4852257 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4852257

Katherine J. Strandburg

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/no3i9t

Salome Viljoen (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Helen F. Nissenbaum

Cornell Tech NYC ( email )

2 W Loop Rd
New York, NY 10044
United States

Cornell Tech ( email )

2 W Loop Rd
New York, NY 10044
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
116
Abstract Views
513
Rank
516,795
PlumX Metrics