Banks as Firms’ Blockholders: A Study in Spain

Posted: 28 May 2004 Last revised: 31 Aug 2014

See all articles by Josep A. Tribo

Josep A. Tribo

Stevens Institute of Technology

María José Casasola Martínez

University of Salamanca - Administration and Business Economics

Date Written: January 1, 2010

Abstract

This article analyses how a firm’s returns are affected when a bank becomes a large blockholder. We investigate this issue by taking into consideration the types of blockholders that build coalitions with banks in order to control a firm. We find that the effect on a firm’s returns is negative when a bank buys the largest stake and forms coalitions with other banks. However, this negative effect does not apply in other situations. We underscore our theoretical conjectures based on an empirical analysis of a panel dataset comprising a representative sample of listed and unlisted Spanish firms over the period 1996 to 2000.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Main Blockholders, Financial Institutions

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Tribo Gine, Josep Antonio and Casasola Martínez, María José, Banks as Firms’ Blockholders: A Study in Spain (January 1, 2010). Tribo, J.A., Casasola, M.J. (2010) "Banks as Firms’ Blockholders: A Study for Spain”. Applied Financial Economics 20(5), pp. 425-438., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=485602

Josep Antonio Tribo Gine (Contact Author)

Stevens Institute of Technology ( email )

Hoboken, NJ 07030
United States
9292708869 (Phone)
07030 (Fax)

María José Casasola Martínez

University of Salamanca - Administration and Business Economics ( email )

Campus Miguel de Unamuno
Salamanca, ES-37007
Spain
+34 923 294400 Ext. 3329 (Phone)

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