Population and Regulation

Mulligan, Casey B.; Shleifer, Andrei

doi:10.2139/ssrn.485722

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Population and Regulation

36 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2004

See all articles by Casey B. Mulligan

Casey B. Mulligan

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history. We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations. Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation.

JEL Classification: H11, K2, L51, P51

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Mulligan, Casey B. and Shleifer, Andrei, Population and Regulation (December 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=485722 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.485722