Persuasion in Politics

American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 2, May 2004

12 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2004  

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kevin M. Murphy

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be rented out to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members' core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Shleifer, Andrei and Murphy, Kevin M., Persuasion in Politics. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 2, May 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=485723

Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Kevin M. Murphy

University of Chicago ( email )

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Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7280 (Phone)
773-702-2699 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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