Replication and Reinterpretation of "Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted'"

9 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2024

See all articles by Lucas Rentschler

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Jacob Meyer

Cornell University

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University School of Law

Austin Brooksby

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robbie Spofford

Independent Researcher

Abstract

Smith and Wilson (2018) report an experiment involving a modified ultimatum game wherein the responder decides whether or not to participate in the game. They note that adding this option results in play closer to sub-game perfect predictions than previously observed. They suggest their results are explained by a model of decision-making rooted in Smith (1759). However, in Smith and Wilson (2018), the results of this play are contrasted against stylized facts from the literature, rather than statistically compared with an analogous control treatment. To ensure their interpretation is warranted, we conducted experiments of both their augmented game and a standard ultimatum game. Results from our augmented ultimatum game are consistent with those reported in Smith and Wilson (2018); however, there is no statistical difference between these results and those from the standard ultimatum game sessions. This highlights the need to include appropriate control treatments in experimental designs.

Keywords: Ultimatum game, Replication, Adam Smith

Suggested Citation

Rentschler, Lucas and Meyer, Jacob and Smith, Vernon L. and Brooksby, Austin and Spofford, Robbie, Replication and Reinterpretation of "Equilibrium Play in Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted'". Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4860065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4860065

Lucas Rentschler (Contact Author)

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

Jacob Meyer

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Vernon L. Smith

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2830 (Phone)

Chapman University School of Law ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States

Austin Brooksby

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Robbie Spofford

Independent Researcher ( email )

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