Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

FEEM Working Paper No. 113.2003

29 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2004

See all articles by Carlo Carraro

Carlo Carraro

Ca' Foscari University of Venice; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Green Growth Knowledge Platform

Carmen Marchiori

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); University College London

Sonia Oreffice

University of Surrey

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Is a minimum participation rule a way to offset these free-riding incentives? Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to tie their hands through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come into force. In the second stage, countries decide whether to sign the treaty. In the third stage, the equilibrium values of the decision variables are set. At the equilibrium, both the minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium. This paper thus explains why in international negotiations all countries often agree on a minimum participation rule even when some of them do not intend to sign the treaty. The paper also analyses the optimal size of the minimum participation constraint.

Keywords: Agreements, Climate, Negotiations, Policy, Incentives

JEL Classification: H0, H4, 03

Suggested Citation

Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen and Oreffice, Sonia, Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties (December 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 113.2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486084

Carlo Carraro (Contact Author)

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

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Carmen Marchiori

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )

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University College London

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Sonia Oreffice

University of Surrey ( email )

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United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/soniaoreffice/

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