Decentralised Job Matching

42 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2004

See all articles by Guillaume Haeringer

Guillaume Haeringer

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents' actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

Keywords: Two-sided matching, Job market, Subgame perfect equilibrium, irreversibilities

JEL Classification: C78, C62, J41

Suggested Citation

Haeringer, Guillaume and Wooders, Myrna H., Decentralised Job Matching (December 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 114.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486085

Guillaume Haeringer (Contact Author)

City University of New York, Baruch College - Zicklin School of Business - Department of Economics and Finance

17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

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