Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

42 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2004

See all articles by Gary Charness

Gary Charness

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Date Written: September 6, 2006

Abstract

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play.

We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments.

Keywords: Groups, Networks, Game Theory, Equilibrium Selection, Equilibrium Refinement, Majority Voting, Group Play, Robust-belief Equilibrium

JEL Classification: D85, A14, C72, C91, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Charness, Gary and Jackson, Matthew O., Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation (September 6, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486183

Gary Charness (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

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Santa Fe, NM 87501
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