The Effect of Expected Shareholder Litigation on Corporate ESG Reporting: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

57 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2024

See all articles by Lijun (Gillian) Lei

Lijun (Gillian) Lei

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Sydney Qing Shu

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Accountancy

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma

Date Written: June 10, 2024

Abstract

This study examines the relation between expected shareholder litigation and the tone and issuance of ESG reports. We do so by exploiting a U.S. Supreme Court ruling (Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd) that exogenously reduced expected litigation costs for non-U.S. firms that trade on both U.S. and non-U.S. exchanges (i.e., U.S.-cross-listed foreign firms). We find that after Morrison, U.S.-cross-listed foreign firms increased the optimistic tone in their ESG reports. This result is consistent with firms perceiving less litigation risk tied to their optimistic ESG statements. We also document that the relative likelihood of issuing an ESG report, engaging in external assurance, or adopting the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines decreases following Morrison. As stakeholders' demand for high-quality ESG reporting continues to grow, our study provides important evidence to regulators and standard setters who seek to understand the effects of litigation risk on the quality of ESG reporting.

Suggested Citation

Lei, Lijun and Shu, Sydney Qing and Thomas, Wayne B., The Effect of Expected Shareholder Litigation on Corporate ESG Reporting: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment (June 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4863130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4863130

Lijun Lei

University of North Carolina at Greensboro ( email )

P.O.Box 26170
Greensboro, NC 27412
United States

Sydney Qing Shu

Miami University of Ohio - Department of Accountancy

3094 Farmer School of Business
800 E. High St.
Oxford, OH 45056
United States

Wayne B. Thomas (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma ( email )

Michael F. Price College of Business,
307 W Brooks, Rm 212B
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-5789 (Phone)
405-325-7348 (Fax)

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