Every Vote Counts: Mandatory Disclosure and Voting Outcomes
53 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2024
Date Written: June 16, 2024
Abstract
We investigate the efficacy of policies that require fund managers to disclose how they vote in shareholder meetings, using a large international sample and staggered regulatory changes. Proposal-level analyses show that after the rule adoption, management-sponsored proposals in the affected jurisdictions are more likely to face significant dissent or defeat. The increase in opposition is more pronounced for the proposals with negative proxy advisor recommendations, suggesting the incremental dissenting votes incorporate at least low-cost information on proposal quality. Our findings underscore the importance of information transparency in motivating governance participation and improving shareholder democracy. However, the potential benefits of the increased monitoring may be influenced by the quality of proxy advisors' information output.
Keywords: Disclosure, Voting, Regulation, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G15, G34, M40, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation