Every Vote Counts: Mandatory Disclosure and Voting Outcomes

53 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2024

See all articles by Nan Li

Nan Li

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Yeo Sang (Johnny) Yoon

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Date Written: June 16, 2024

Abstract

We investigate the efficacy of policies that require fund managers to disclose how they vote in shareholder meetings, using a large international sample and staggered regulatory changes. Proposal-level analyses show that after the rule adoption, management-sponsored proposals in the affected jurisdictions are more likely to face significant dissent or defeat. The increase in opposition is more pronounced for the proposals with negative proxy advisor recommendations, suggesting the incremental dissenting votes incorporate at least low-cost information on proposal quality. Our findings underscore the importance of information transparency in motivating governance participation and improving shareholder democracy. However, the potential benefits of the increased monitoring may be influenced by the quality of proxy advisors' information output.

Keywords: Disclosure, Voting, Regulation, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G15, G34, M40, K22

Suggested Citation

Li, Nan and Yoon, Yeo Sang (Johnny), Every Vote Counts: Mandatory Disclosure and Voting Outcomes (June 16, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4867352 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4867352

Nan Li (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Yeo Sang (Johnny) Yoon

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

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