Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

39 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2004

See all articles by Myrna H. Wooders

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on that there exists a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent with conformity. We also introduce a new concept of conformity that allows players to conform and yet perform different actions. This is achieved by the endogenous assignment of roles to players and by allowing actions to be conditional on roles. We conclude by relating our research to some experimental literature.

Suggested Citation

Wooders, Myrna H. and Cartwright, Edward, Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results (December 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 119.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486742

Myrna H. Wooders (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University ( email )

The Gateway
Leicester, LE1 9BH
United Kingdom

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