Social Conformity in Games with Many Players

34 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2004

See all articles by Myrna H. Wooders

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University

Reinhard Selten

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few groups of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we define and characterise a family of games admitting existence of approximated Nash equilibria in pure strategies that induce partition of the player sets with the desired properties. We also introduce the Conley-Wooders concept of "crowding types" into our description players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player - those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others - and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With this assumption of "within crowding type anonymity" and a "convexity of taste-types" assumption we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.

Suggested Citation

Wooders, Myrna H. and Cartwright, Edward and Selten, Reinhard, Social Conformity in Games with Many Players (December 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 121.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486762

Myrna H. Wooders (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University ( email )

The Gateway
Leicester, LE1 9BH
United Kingdom

Reinhard Selten

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )

Adenauerallee 24-42
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
++49-228 73-9190 (Phone)
++49-228 73-9193 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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