Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

35 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2004

See all articles by Myrna H. Wooders

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large - must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.

Suggested Citation

Wooders, Myrna H. and Cartwright, Edward, Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (December 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 123.2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.486843

Myrna H. Wooders (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Edward Cartwright

De Montfort University ( email )

The Gateway
Leicester, LE1 9BH
United Kingdom

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