Political Discipline and the Dynamic Consistency of Policy

UC Irvine Working Paper 97-98-01

Posted: 13 Jan 1998

See all articles by Michelle R. Garfinkel

Michelle R. Garfinkel

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Jaewoo Lee

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Date Written: 1997

Abstract

Positive analyses of the credibility constraint in policy often neglect the fact that political incentive constraints are also relevant in understanding observed policies. With a focus on government tax and spending policies, this paper identifies an important and positive role for political constraints given that the credibility constraint is binding.

JEL Classification: H29, H5

Suggested Citation

Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Lee, Jaewoo, Political Discipline and the Dynamic Consistency of Policy (1997). UC Irvine Working Paper 97-98-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=48685

Michelle R. Garfinkel (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-824-3190 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.uci.edu/~mrgarfin/

Jaewoo Lee

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
202-623-7331 (Phone)
202-623-6334 (Fax)

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