Using Bidder Asymmetry to Increase Seller Revenue
Posted: 12 Jan 2004
There are 2 versions of this paper
Using Bidder Asymmetry to Increase Seller Revenue
Number of pages: 9
Posted: 18 Jul 2002
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Abstract
We construct the optimal selling mechanism in a pure common value environment with two bidders that are not equally well informed. With an optimal mechanism, the seller benefits from bidder asymmetry: her expected revenue increases if the bidder asymmetry increases.
Keywords: Auctions, Common Value, Asymmetric Bidders
JEL Classification: D44, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Povel, Paul and Singh, Rajdeep, Using Bidder Asymmetry to Increase Seller Revenue. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486926
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