Using Bidder Asymmetry to Increase Seller Revenue

Posted: 12 Jan 2004

See all articles by Paul Povel

Paul Povel

University of Houston - Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business

Rajdeep Singh

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

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Abstract

We construct the optimal selling mechanism in a pure common value environment with two bidders that are not equally well informed. With an optimal mechanism, the seller benefits from bidder asymmetry: her expected revenue increases if the bidder asymmetry increases.

Keywords: Auctions, Common Value, Asymmetric Bidders

JEL Classification: D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Povel, Paul and Singh, Rajdeep, Using Bidder Asymmetry to Increase Seller Revenue. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=486926

Paul Povel (Contact Author)

University of Houston - Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business ( email )

University of Houston
334 Melcher Hall
Houston, TX 77204
United States
713-743-4759 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bauer.uh.edu/povel

Rajdeep Singh

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-1061 (Phone)
612-626-1335 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://umn.edu/~rajsingh

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