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Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals

Posted: 4 Feb 2004  

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Law School

David Lazer

Northeastern University - Department of Political Science; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Abstract

We analyze a little-studied regulatory approach that we call management-based regulation. Management-based regulation directs regulated organizations to engage in a planning process that aims toward the achievement of public goals, offering firms flexibility in how they achieve these goals. The paper develops a framework for assessing conditions for using management-based regulation as opposed to the more traditional technology-based or performance-based regulation. Drawing on case studies of management-based regulation in the areas of food safety, industrial safety, and environmental protection, we show how management-based regulation can be an effective strategy when regulated entities are heterogeneous and regulatory outputs are relatively difficult to monitor. In addition to analyzing conditions for the use of management-based regulation, the paper assesses the range of choices regulators confront in designing management-based regulations. We conclude that management-based regulation requires a far more complex intertwining of public and private sectors than is typical of other forms of regulation, owing to regulators' need to intervene at multiple stages of the production process as well as to the degree of ambiguity over what constitutes good management.

Keywords: Regulation, Instrument Choice, Management Systems

JEL Classification: K23, K32, L50

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary and Lazer, David, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals. Law and Society Review, Vol. 37, pp. 691-730, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=487182

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

David Lazer

Northeastern University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Boston, MA 02115
United States
617-373-2796 (Phone)
617-373-5311 (Fax)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Taubman Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-0102 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.davidlazer.com

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