Echo Chambers: Choosing Interlocutors and Messages

Abstract

We present a rational explanation for the formation of echo chambers through a novel communication game in which individuals decide both who to talk to and what to say.  Our key insight reveals a trade-off between collecting information and influencing others when choosing communication partners, thereby shedding light on the mechanics of echo chamber formation.  Our theory and experiment demonstrate that people gather more truthful information from those whose incentives are aligned with their own, but exert greater influence over those whose incentives are not aligned.  This trade-off fundamentally drives individuals' choices in terms of communication.  Our experiment reveals behavioral patterns in which the majority of individuals choose to talk to individuals with aligned incentives, unless the incentive to influence others is extremely high.  These results mirror real-world echo chamber phenomena and provide valuable insights into how information and influence are intertwined in the formation of social networks.

Keywords: echo chambers, cheap talk, matching, experiment