Reforming Securities Litigation & Enforcement for ESG Disclosure

43.3 Review of Litigation 339 (2024)

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper 2024-17

22 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2024 Last revised: 7 Mar 2025

See all articles by Kevin S. Haeberle

Kevin S. Haeberle

University of California, Irvine School of Law; Columbia Law School & Columbia Business School - Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets

Date Written: June 27, 2024

Abstract

This Essay argues that there is a fundamental trade-off that is important to recognize in the ESG context. That trade-off involves giving up what society gains on the margin from applying some aspects of the litigation and enforcement regime to non-financial ESG disclosure in order to get what society gains on the margin from the increased disclosure of the same variety that would result by not applying those aspects of the regime to that disclosure. I therefore further argue that ESG-specific reforms to the litigation and enforcement regime should be carefully considered for potential social welfare gains. After all, there is much skepticism on the scope of the gains associated with a number of aspects of the litigation and enforcement regime, yet much demand and room for non-financial ESG disclosure today.

Keywords: securities regulation, ESG, securities litigation, Securities enforcement

Suggested Citation

Haeberle, Kevin S., Reforming Securities Litigation & Enforcement for ESG Disclosure (June 27, 2024). 43.3 Review of Litigation 339 (2024), UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper 2024-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4879039 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4879039

Kevin S. Haeberle (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E Peltason Dr
Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697
United States

Columbia Law School & Columbia Business School - Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets

New York, NY 10027
United States

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