Reading Law with Linguistics: How Linguistic Theory and Data Inform Statutory Interpretation of Artifact Nouns

Abstract

The Supreme Court will soon decide Garland v. VanDerStok, a case concerning whether a “gun parts kit” or “ghost gun” is a “firearm” subject to regulation under the 1968 Gun Control Act. These “kits,” firearm parts that with additional finishing or combination become an operable firearm, have been used in several mass shootings. For the textualist Supreme Court the case turns on the statute’s meaning, and the briefs and lower court opinions emphasize traditional tools.

This article proposes that the Court complement familiar interpretive tools like dictionaries with new ones. We apply insights from linguistic theory, report new data from ordinary language usage, and present an original survey study of ordinary Americans. This evidence supports that the gun parts kits identified by the government fit within the meaning of “firearm.” This analysis has important practical implications for VanDerStok and the regulation of unassembled and unfinished firearms. The article’s case study in the legal interpretation of artifact nouns also carries broader implications. We develop lessons for statutory interpretation theory and legal philosophy.

Keywords: legal interpretation, statutory interpretation, textualism, Supreme Court, experimental jurisprudence, law and language