Structure of Option Repricings: Determinants and Consequences

Posted: 20 Jan 2004

See all articles by Fabrizio Ferri

Fabrizio Ferri

University of Miami - Miami Business School

Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

I present a novel dataset of over 4,000 firm-level repricings of executives and employees' stock options over the period 1987-2002. For a sub-sample of 587 repricings characterized by a homogeneous institutional environment, I investigate determinants and consequences of the structure of the repricing offer, defined in terms of: i) eligibility criteria (i.e. who is eligible to participate?), ii) economic terms (e.g. new exercise price, number of new options granted in replacement of each underwater option), and iii) exerciseability conditions (e.g. restarted vesting schedule, other retention-enhancing features).

Overall, I find significant evidence of managerial self-serving behavior in certain aspects of the design of the repricing offer. In particular: i) more visible firms, with stronger corporate governance, are more likely to exclude executives from the repricing offer; ii) retention-enhancing features (which reduce the value of the options) are significantly less likely when executives' options are repriced than in employee-only repricings; iii) repricings are timed just before significant price run-ups when the CEO participates in the repricing, but not in employee-only repricings; iv) higher institutional ownership is associated with economic terms less favorable to executives and stricter exerciseability conditions. The choice of economic terms and exerciseability conditions seems to mostly depend on economic determinants. In particular, firms are more likely to offer a partial repricing when there is a deeper underwater problem, while retention-enhancing features are more frequent when there is a higher perceived retention risk and better outside employment opportunities. Finally, I find weak evidence of a decrease in employee turnover after the repricing, but the extent of such decrease does not seem to depend on the structure of the repricing offer.

Beside contributing to the literature on option repricings, these results may be of interest to investors called to vote upon repricing proposals by recent NYSE and NASDAQ rules requiring mandatory shareholder approval for all repricings - unless explicitly authorized by the stock option plan.

Keywords: option repricing, employee stock options, employee retention

JEL Classification: G34, M52, J33, G12, K22

Suggested Citation

Ferri, Fabrizio, Structure of Option Repricings: Determinants and Consequences (January 2004). EFMA 2004 Basel Meetings Paper; 14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting (FEA). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=488162

Fabrizio Ferri (Contact Author)

University of Miami - Miami Business School ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33146-6531
United States

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