Consumer Dishonesty in Sharing Economy: Evidence from the Bike-Sharing Industry

34 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2024

See all articles by Guangyu Cao

Guangyu Cao

Peking University - School of Economics

Wei Dai

Independent

Juanjuan Meng

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management

Xinyao Qiu

Stanford University

Date Written: July 03, 2024

Abstract

This study examines the impact of firms' pricing policies on consumer dishonest behaviors in the context of the sharing economy. We examine over two million trip records from a bike-sharing company and develop measures of customers' dishonest behaviors at the trip level. Using variations in prices due to randomly distributed coupons and an exogenous pricing shock from a promotional campaign, we find that customers are substantially more likely to engage in dishonest behaviors when faced with higher prices. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the rise in cheating behaviors is more pronounced among male and non-student users, and after daylight hours. We also find suggestive evidence that the promotional campaign triggers reciprocal behaviors from consumers, who demonstrate reduced cheating after having experienced the promotion, with prices held constant.

Keywords: Dishonesty, Cheating, Pricing Variation, Reciprocity, Sharing Economy

JEL Classification: D12, D90, L86, C81

Suggested Citation

Cao, Guangyu and Dai, Wei and Meng, Juanjuan and Qiu, Xinyao, Consumer Dishonesty in Sharing Economy: Evidence from the Bike-Sharing Industry (July 03, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4883702 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4883702

Guangyu Cao (Contact Author)

Peking University - School of Economics ( email )

Yiheyuan Road
the school of economics builiding
Beijing, 000000
China

Wei Dai

Independent ( email )

Juanjuan Meng

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management ( email )

Peking University
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.pku.edu.cn/faculty_and_research/en/en_teacherDetail.html?crmurl=http://crm.gsm.pku.ed

Xinyao Qiu

Stanford University

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