Does Regulating Entry Requirements Lead to More Effective Principals?

55 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2024

See all articles by Steven Rivkin

Steven Rivkin

University of Illinois at Chicago

Wes Austin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Bingjie Chen

American Institutes for Research

Dan Goldhaber

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Eric A. Hanushek

Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kriatian Holden

American Institutes for Research

Cory Koedel

University of Missouri

Helen F. Ladd

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy

Jin Luo

University of Texas at Dallas

Eric Parsons

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics

Gregory Phelan

Kennesaw State University

Tim R. Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Mavzuna Turaeva

Duke University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Anecdotal evidence points to the importance of school principals, but the limited existing research has neither provided consistent results nor indicated any set of essential characteristics of effective principals.  This paper, combining six state-specific research teams, executes common analytical protocols that exploit the extensive student-level, panel data across six states to investigate both variations in principal performance and the relationship between effectiveness and key certification factors.  While principal effectiveness varies widely across states, there is little indication that regulation of the background and training of principals yields consistently effective performance.  Having prior teaching or management experience is not related to our estimates of principal value-added, suggesting that common entry requirements raise the opportunity cost of becoming a principal without being systematically related to achievement growth.

Keywords: Leadership, Principals, School/Teacher Effectiveness, Certification/Licensure, Longitudinal Studies

Suggested Citation

Rivkin, Steven and Austin, Wes and Chen, Bingjie and Goldhaber, Dan and Hanushek, Eric A. and Holden, Kriatian and Koedel, Cory and Ladd, Helen F. and Luo, Jin and Parsons, Eric and Phelan, Gregory and Sass, Tim and Turaeva, Mavzuna, Does Regulating Entry Requirements Lead to More Effective Principals?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4885368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4885368

Steven Rivkin

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

Wes Austin

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Bingjie Chen

American Institutes for Research ( email )

1990 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-1107
United States

Dan Goldhaber

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Eric A. Hanushek (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-736-0942 (Phone)
650-723-1687 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kriatian Holden

American Institutes for Research ( email )

Cory Koedel

University of Missouri ( email )

Helen F. Ladd

Duke University - Sanford School of Public Policy ( email )

201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States
919-613-7352 (Phone)

Jin Luo

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

Eric Parsons

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics ( email )

118 Professional Building
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

Gregory Phelan

Kennesaw State University ( email )

1000 Chastain Rd
Kennesaw, GA 30144
United States

Tim Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

Department of Economics
35 Broad Street, 6th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
404-413-0150 (Phone)
404-413-0145 (Fax)

Mavzuna Turaeva

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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