Corruption and Governance in Ghanaian State-Owned Enterprises: An In-Depth Analysis

Abstract

This study examines the phenomenon of political involvement in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana, focusing on the acquisition of shares by politicians and its impact on governance and performance. Through document analysis, interviews, and case studies, the research reveals widespread political interference in SOEs via direct share acquisition, board appointments, and contract awards. The study finds that this involvement often leads to conflicts of interest, weak governance structures, poor financial performance, and operational inefficiencies. Despite regulatory frameworks like the Public Financial Management Act and the State Enterprises Commission, political influence continues to undermine their effectiveness. The paper draws on Conflict of Interest Theory, Corruption Theory, and Governance Theory to analyze these issues. It concludes with policy recommendations to strengthen regulatory oversight, enhance transparency and accountability, implement merit-based appointments, and increase public participation in SOE management. This research contributes to the ongoing discourse on improving SOE governance and performance in Ghana and across Africa.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​