The Role of Own-Source Tax Revenue in Disciplining Local Government Spending

60 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2024

See all articles by Marco Errico

Marco Errico

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Stefan Huber

Rice University

Delphine Samuels

University of Chicago -- Booth School of Business

Anthony Welsch

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: July 09, 2024

Abstract

This study examines the role of own-source tax revenue in disciplining local government spending. We ask whether the Italian Imposta Municipale Unica (IMU) tax reform of 2012, which replaced national transfers with local property taxes, affected local government cost management. We find that municipalities more affected by the reform paid significantly less for public works after the reform without incurring greater delays in contract execution or cost overruns. We also find evidence that the cost savings resulted from local officials achieving greater price discounts and awarding more contracts to non-local vendors. Consistent with increased accountability explaining the improvements in cost savings, our results are stronger for municipalities with incumbent mayors facing re-election. 

Keywords: , public procurement, intergovernmental transfers, own-source tax revenue

Suggested Citation

Errico, Marco and Huber, Stefan and Samuels, Delphine and Welsch, Anthony, The Role of Own-Source Tax Revenue in Disciplining Local Government Spending (July 09, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4889954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4889954

Marco Errico

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Stefan Huber

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Delphine Samuels (Contact Author)

University of Chicago -- Booth School of Business ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637-1561
United States

Anthony Welsch

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S Woodlawn Ave
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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