The Political Hare and the Stag Hunt

47 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2024

See all articles by Yaroslav Rosokha

Yaroslav Rosokha

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Xinxin Lyu

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Denis Tverskoi

DySoC/NIMBioS

Sergey Gavrilets

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 10, 2024

Abstract

We theoretically and experimentally study an indefinite dynamic game intended to capture two main aspects of the political process-elections in which opposing factions compete by spending resources and policy-making in which those same factions are required to cooperate for the successful legislature. The main theoretical result is that limits on spending in the election contest increase cooperation. On the experimental side, we first test and confirm theoretical predictions and then explore whether such limits could arise endogenously. We find that a majority of subjects are successful in establishing a consensus on low limits, leading to higher cooperation and welfare.

Keywords: JEL classification: C73, C92, D91 Political Economy, Endogenous Institutions, Dynamic Games, Cooperation, Coordination, Contest, Experiments

Suggested Citation

Rosokha, Yaroslav and Lyu, Xinxin and Tverskoi, Denis and Gavrilets, Sergey, The Political Hare and the Stag Hunt (July 10, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4891324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4891324

Yaroslav Rosokha (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Xinxin Lyu

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Denis Tverskoi

DySoC/NIMBioS ( email )

Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

Sergey Gavrilets

University of Tennessee, Knoxville ( email )

Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

HOME PAGE: http://volweb2.utk.edu/~gavrila/

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