Attributions and Deescalation: The Public Dynamics of U.S.-China Crisis Deescalation

Abstract

Policymakers and scholars alike have expressed grave concerns over the risks of an inadvertent crisis between the United States and China. What could be done to deescalate such a crisis and reduce the risk of war? Direct theoretical and empirical guidance on this question is scarce. Existing literature suggests that publics in both countries are nationalistic and reward confrontation and displays of strength. We challenge this conclusion and argue that handling a crisis with restraint through responsibility sharing can facilitate deescalation. First, we construct an interactive theory of crisis deescalation based on (1) attribution, where one side can send a public signal to attribute blame for the crisis to self, to other, or to neither parties; and (2) response, where the other side can either accept or reject the attribution. Then, we design parallel and interactive survey experiments in the United States and China to map our theory to real-world empirics. We find that blaming neither parties by attributing the crisis as an accident received the strongest approval from both American and Chinese citizens, especially when the other side cooperates in accepting the attribution. Our findings illuminate the public feasibilities of different policy pathways of deescalating an inadvertent crisis and reducing the risk of war.

Keywords: Crisis deescalation, attribution, U.S.-China relations, survey experiments