On the Effectiveness of Gendering Politics

42 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2024

See all articles by Arcangelo Dimico

Arcangelo Dimico

Queen's University Belfast - Queen's Management School; Queen's University Belfast

Francesco Lancia

Ca' Foscari University of Venice; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Alessia Russo

BI Norwegian Business School

Date Written: December 01, 2023

Abstract

We examine the effectiveness of gender reforms in increasing women's representation in selected offices. We generate exogenous variations in representation at the Italian regional and municipal elections using the passage of two gender reforms: i) party-list gender quotas, a supply-side reform intended to influence party decisions regarding candidacy, and ii) double-gender preference systems, a demand-side reform intended to influence voting decisions on candidates. We show that party-list gender quotas have no effect on the likelihood of women winning a seat, whereas double-gender preference systems are effective in increasing women's representation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply-side reforms are susceptible to party-list manipulations, which undermine their effectiveness. In constituencies with a stronger voter gender bias, supply-side reforms may also unintentionally have a negative impact on women's representation in leadership positions.

Keywords: Gender Reforms, Italian Local Elections, Political Representation JEL Codes D72

JEL Classification: D72, H52, P16

Suggested Citation

Dimico, Arcangelo and Lancia, Francesco and Russo, Alessia, On the Effectiveness of Gendering Politics (December 01, 2023). Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics Research Paper Series No. 34/WP/2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4894798 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4894798

Arcangelo Dimico (Contact Author)

Queen's University Belfast - Queen's Management School ( email )

Riddel Hall
185 Stranmillis Road
Belfast, BT9 5EE
United Kingdom

Queen's University Belfast ( email )

Francesco Lancia

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unive.it/pag/28365/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Alessia Russo

BI Norwegian Business School ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0442
Norway

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