Technology Coopetition and Voluntary Disclosures of Innovation

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming

56 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2024

See all articles by Jun Oh

Jun Oh

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr School of Business, Purdue University

P. Eric Yeung

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Bo Zhu

Southwest Jiaotong University - School of Economics & Management

Date Written: August 14, 2022

Abstract

We examine firms' voluntary disclosures of innovation under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by i) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and ii) competition for standard implementation to obtain standard-essential patents, which create incentives for firms to deviate from the expected level of information sharing. We document a decrease in 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, more generic 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, and a longer delay of patent disclosures via the USPTO after a firm joins an SSO. Among alternative explanations, our evidence is most supportive of the hypothesis that firms strategically withhold innovation information.

Keywords: Standard setting organizations, R&D disclosure, Patent disclosures, SEP litigation, Coopetition

Suggested Citation

Oh, Jun and Yeung, P. Eric and Zhu, Bo, Technology Coopetition and Voluntary Disclosures of Innovation (August 14, 2022). The Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4895065

Jun Oh (Contact Author)

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr School of Business, Purdue University ( email )

403 Mitch Daniels Blvd.
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

HOME PAGE: http://junoh.me

P. Eric Yeung

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

Bo Zhu

Southwest Jiaotong University - School of Economics & Management ( email )

1 Jingqu Rd
Chengdu, Sichuan 610031
China

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