Delegating Decisions to Experts

Posted: 26 Jan 2004

See all articles by Hao Li

Hao Li

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Queen's University - Department of Economics

Wing Suen

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance

Abstract

We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information.

Suggested Citation

Li, Hao and Suen, Wing C., Delegating Decisions to Experts. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 1, Pt. 2, pp. S311-S335, February 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=489701

Hao Li (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada
416-978-5105 (Phone)

Queen's University - Department of Economics ( email )

Dunning Hall
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
613-533-2275 (Phone)
613-533-6668 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/li/

Wing C. Suen

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

8th Floor Kennedy Town Centre
23 Belcher's Street
Kennedy Town
Hong Kong
852 2859 1052 (Phone)
852 2548 1152 (Fax)

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