Should Human Capital Development Programs be Mandatory or Voluntary? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Mentorship

80 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2024 Last revised: 2 Jan 2025

See all articles by Jason Sandvik

Jason Sandvik

Eller College of Management, University of Arizona

Richard E. Saouma

Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University

Nathan Seegert

University of Utah - Department of Finance

Christopher Stanton

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 19, 2024

Abstract

In a field experiment, we find that a mandatory mentorship program raises worker productivity while a voluntary version of the program does not. A significant reason why the mandatory program results in larger gains is that the lowest productivity employees do not participate when the program is voluntary, despite their having the greatest treatment benefits. A nationally representative survey of U.S. workers shows wide variation in human capital development program participation, suggesting that understanding self-selection is important for firms’ returns on these programs across a variety of settings. Our findings have implications for resource allocation, experimental design, productivity dispersion, and inequality.

Keywords: Human Capital Development, RCT, Mentorship, Training, Personnel Economics, Program Evaluation

JEL Classification: C93, M53, M54

Suggested Citation

Sandvik, Jason and Saouma, Richard E. and Seegert, Nathan and Stanton, Christopher, Should Human Capital Development Programs be Mandatory or Voluntary? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Mentorship (December 19, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4899777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4899777

Jason Sandvik (Contact Author)

Eller College of Management, University of Arizona ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States

Richard E. Saouma

Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University ( email )

Agriculture Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824-1122
United States

Nathan Seegert

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

Christopher Stanton

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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