How the Source of Financing Discrimination Affects Housing Opportunities for FHA Buyers

49 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2024

See all articles by Sonia Gilbukh

Sonia Gilbukh

City University of New York (CUNY) - Department of Real Estate

James Conklin

University of Georgia

Luis A. Lopez

University of Illinois at Chicago

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate

Date Written: July 20, 2024

Abstract

In this paper we ask whether and why home buyers who use Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans are excluded from a part of the housing market. Using proprietary data on for-sale real estate listings, we find that 42% of for-sale listings of FHA eligible homes state that FHA offers are not acceptable for the seller. We thus find that the FHA program rules and regulations, while intended to help low income families become homeowners, significantly limit the choice set of properties for these borrowers. We find that while location and time accounts for only about 10% of the variation in whether the FHA offers are acceptable, real estate agents explain over 40% of the variation. We further find that having participated in an FHA transaction (either as a buyer or a selling agent), agents are more likely to have their subsequent listings open to FHA borrowers. We thus conclude that agents play a large role in market access for FHA borrowers, in part because they expect the program to be difficult to navigate. * We thank the Steven L. Newman Real Estate Institute for the generous support.

JEL Classification: R28, R20

Suggested Citation

Gilbukh, Sonia and Conklin, James and Lopez, Luis A. and Ambrose, Brent W., How the Source of Financing Discrimination Affects Housing Opportunities for FHA Buyers (July 20, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4899798 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4899798

Sonia Gilbukh (Contact Author)

City University of New York (CUNY) - Department of Real Estate ( email )

United States

James Conklin

University of Georgia

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Luis A. Lopez

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate ( email )

Smeal College of Business,
Penn State University
University Park, PA US-0-PA 16802
United States
8148670066 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.psu.edu/brentwambrose/

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