Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility *

40 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2024

See all articles by Harry Di Pei

Harry Di Pei

Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Bruno H. Strulovici

Northwestern University

Date Written: December 01, 2021

Abstract

We present a model of criminal behavior and information aggregation in which the incentives to commit and to report crime are endogenous. An individual has several opportunities to commit crime, each of which associated with a witness with private reporting preferences and retaliation risk. We study how the mechanism used to map witness testimonies into verdicts affects criminal behavior and witness credibility when the punishment in case of conviction is large relative to the benefit of committing crime. We show that convicting defendants based on the probability that they have committed at least one crime reduces the maximal number of crimes but increases expected crime frequency and undermines the informativeness of witness testimonies. We characterize mechanisms that minimize the expected number of crimes subject to an upper bound on the fraction of wrongful convictions. The optimum is always attained by one of two aggregation rules discussed in legal scholarship.

Keywords: Information Aggregation, Soft Evidence, Deterrence, Adjudication Rule D82, D83, K42

Suggested Citation

Pei, Harry Di and Strulovici, Bruno H., Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility * (December 01, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4901931

Harry Di Pei (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Bruno H. Strulovici

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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