Seeing Like a Citizen: Experimental Evidence on How Empowerment Affects Engagement with the State

Abstract

Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low-income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state, or forego engaging with the state altogether, due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, DRC designed to empower citizens in their negotiations with opportunistic state agents: one provided information about statutory payment obligations, the other offered protection from abusive officials. We examine the effects not only on citizen payment amounts (intensive margin effects) but also on whether citizens start making formal payments, or any payments, to the state (extensive margin effects). We find that protection, and to a lesser extent information, had clear extensive margin effects, increasing the share of citizens making formal payments and engaging with the state. These findings show how empowering citizens can help countries transition away from a low revenue, low engagement equilibrium.