Structured Accountability and New Venture Performance: Evidence from a Business Accelerator

73 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2024

See all articles by Michael Leatherbee

Michael Leatherbee

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile - Department of Industrial Engineering

Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance

Edgar E. Kausel

University of Chile - Faculty of Economics and Business

Date Written: June 01, 2024

Abstract

At an individual level, accountability structures have a negative effect on performance as task uncertainty increases. Less is known about its role on new ventures. We conduct a two-year randomized controlled trial on 361 ventures to test the effects of structured accountability — a policy that encourages founders to periodically express their strategic plans and progress in front of others — on venture performance and conduct in-depth interviews to a randomly selected subsample. We find suggestive evidence that venture performance is affected heterogeneously: structured accountability aids or harms startups as a function of the founders’ level of formal education. Lower-educated founders are benefited (despite their reluctance to it), while higher-educated founders are at least unaffected (despite their desire for more of it).

Keywords: accelerators, entrepreneurship, structured accountability, randomized controlled trial

Suggested Citation

Leatherbee, Michael and Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita and Kausel, Edgar E., Structured Accountability and New Venture Performance: Evidence from a Business Accelerator (June 01, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4903837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4903837

Michael Leatherbee (Contact Author)

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile - Department of Industrial Engineering ( email )

Av. Vicuna Mackenna 4860
Macul
Santiago
Chile

Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance ( email )

United Kingdom
+442074057686 (Phone)

Edgar E. Kausel

University of Chile - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Universidad de Chile
Diagonal Paraguay 257
Santiago
Chile
(56 2) 978 3790 (Phone)

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