Affordable Housing, Unaffordable Credit? Concentration and High-Cost Lending for Manufactured Homes

67 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2024

See all articles by Sebastian Doerr

Sebastian Doerr

Bank for International Settlements; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andreas Fuster

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 29, 2024

Abstract

Policy makers place high hopes in manufactured homes, the largest source of unsubsidized affordable housing in the US, to alleviate housing supply shortages. This paper shows that high market concentration in the multi-billion dollar market for manufactured home loans enables lenders to charge substantially higher interest rates than for site-built homes. Loan-level data indicate that loans in counties with higher market concentration carry significantly higher rates. Evidence from bunching around the regulatory HOEPA rate threshold, an instrumental variable analysis, as well as a difference-indifferences analysis around the introduction of HOEPA suggest a causal relationship. We establish that integrated lenders, which play an outsized role in the market for manufactured home loans, charge particularly high rates, and additional results suggest that these lenders exploit their market power over borrowers.

Keywords: mortgage market, competition, household finance, manufactured homes, mobile homes

JEL Classification: G21, G23, L13, R31

Suggested Citation

Doerr, Sebastian and Fuster, Andreas, Affordable Housing, Unaffordable Credit? Concentration and High-Cost Lending for Manufactured Homes (July 29, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4908876

Sebastian Doerr (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.sdoerr.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Andreas Fuster

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Quartier UNIL-Chamberonne
Bâtiment Extranef
CH-1015 Lausanne
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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