Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort

32 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2004

See all articles by Axel Engellandt

Axel Engellandt

University of Basel

Regina T. Riphahn

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide 'stepping stones' into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey, we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60%. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of endogenous selection into temporary employment.

JEL Classification: C25, J24, J41

Suggested Citation

Engellandt, Axel and Riphahn, Regina T., Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort (January 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=491121

Axel Engellandt

University of Basel ( email )

Petersplatz 1
Basel, CH-4003
Switzerland

Regina T. Riphahn (Contact Author)

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg - Department of Economics ( email )

Lange Gasse 20
Nuernberg, D-90403
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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