A Simple Agent-Based Model for Simulating Single Winner Elections

27 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2024

See all articles by Nathan Atkinson

Nathan Atkinson

University of Wisconsin Law School

Scott Ganz

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business; American Enterprise Institute

John Mantus

Carnegie Mellon University

Date Written: July 31, 2024

Abstract

This paper examines the growing interest in electoral reform through the development of a simple agent-based model designed to simulate electoral outcomes under various institutional frameworks. By leveraging this model, we demonstrate how to analyze a spectrum of ranked-choice election procedures. The model's flexibility accommodates diverse candidate selection mechanisms and voter populations. Adjustable parameters allow for variations in both the representativeness of primary voters and voters' perceptions of candidate electability. This approach facilitates straightforward and adaptable comparisons of different voting methods, providing valuable insights into their potential impacts on electoral outcomes. Code for the simulations is provided.

Keywords: Electoral Reform, Agent-Based Model, Voting Methods

Suggested Citation

Atkinson, Nathan and Ganz, Scott and Mantus, John, A Simple Agent-Based Model for Simulating Single Winner Elections (July 31, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4911226

Nathan Atkinson (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin Law School ( email )

975 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Scott Ganz

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

American Enterprise Institute

1789 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

John Mantus

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

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